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Abstract
A large literature has related the failure of interest rate parity in the foreign exchange
market to the existence of a time-varying risk premium. Nevertheless, most modern
open economy DSGE models imply a (near) perfect interest rate parity condition. This
paper presents a stylized two-country incomplete-markets model in which countries have
strong precautionary motives because they face international liquidity constraints, the
presence of which successfully generates a time-varying risk premium: the country that
has accumulated debt after experiencing relative worse times has stronger precautionary
motives and its asset carries a risk premium.
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1 Introduction
Large deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) are a strong regularity in the data.
This paper addresses this puzzling empirical fact on international relative prices in a simple
two-country model with incomplete international nancial markets. In particular, nancial
markets are incomplete in the sense that countries face borrowing constraints on an inter-
nationally traded bond, the presence of which generates a time-varying risk-premium in the
foreign exchange market.
The paper connects to a long literature, both empirical and theoretical. Uncovered interest
rate parity, which states that the (nominal) interest rate dierential should be equated to the
expected change in the exchange rate, is a central feature of virtually all general equilibrium
open economy models. While it would appear logical that investors would demand higher
interest rates on currencies that are expected to fall in value, empirical evidence suggests
that currency prices for high interest rates tend, instead, to appreciate. This departure from
uncovered interest rate parity, also known as the forward premium anomaly, has been exten-
sively documented. Following a seminal paper of Fama (1984), one strand of the literature
argues that the failure of this interest parity relationship can be attributed to a time-varying
risk premium on foreign exchange.1
Empirically, the violation of the uncovered interest rate parity condition is usually tested
by a simple regression of (actual) exchange rate variations on the nominal interest rate dif-
ferential. Under the assumption of rational expectations and risk neutral agents, the forward
exchange rate is an unbiased estimator of the future spot exchange rate and therefore, since
covered interest rate parity holds, the UIP regression should theoretically deliver a regression
coecient of 1. This is severely violated in the data, where, for advanced economies, the UIP
coecient is generally found to be much lower than 1, typically even negative.
Standard macroeconomic models of the international economy have a hard time in gen-
erating time-varying risk premia. This paper asks the question under which conditions a
risk-premium can be generated that disturbs the otherwise tight link between the interest
rate dierential and subsequent exchange rates. In the two-country model of the present pa-
per, a time-varying risk premium arises from the presence of frictions in international nancial
markets. Countries are assumed to be able to trade an international bond, but are subject
to borrowing constraints, which state that a country cannot borrow more than a constant
fraction K of its output. Both countries have preferences over consumption of domestic and
foreign goods, and are specialized in the production of one type of good (which, for simplicity,
is given as an endowment each period).
Typically, when there are no frictions in international borrowing and lending, a country
that experiences a shock that lowers the value of its income, it would like to access interna-
tional nancial markets in order to achieve a smooth consumption path. On the other hand,
when borrowing constraints are present, there is a possibility that these constraints become
binding at any point in time. As a result, that country might not be able to make use of the
international nancial market for its consumption smoothing purposes, and instead will want
to save for bad times, to prevent becoming constrained in the future. Consequently, close to
1Other explanations include the 'peso problem' (i.e. that agents need to learn about structural changes of
the economy over time and that during this transitional learning period, market participants make systematic
prediction errors) or 'noise trading ' (i.e. that agents are actually irrational because they believe the value of
an asset depends on information other than economic fundamentals).
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the constraints, when precautionary motives become large, consumption risk is increasingly
less shared across countries. The strength of this precautionary motive on interest rates varies
over the cycle. While the eect is strongest close to the constraint, it also has a non-negligible
eect when bond holdings are away from (either country's) constraint, introducing a wedge
between the interest rate dierential and the expected change in exchange rates. This wedge,
which varies with the strength of precautionary eects, can thus be interpreted as a time-
varying risk premium on foreign exchange. In the baseline model, a regression of exchange
rate variations on the interest rate dierential from simulated model data delivers a UIP
regression coecient of 0:688. This shows that the risk premium generated by the proposed
mechanism moves the UIP regression coecient closer to the data, yet it fails to fully account
for the puzzle quantitatively.
Finally, it should be noted that the mechanism that generates the time-varying risk pre-
mium is not connected to nominal risks in the economy. In fact, the model presented in section
2 is an entirely real model. It can be shown, however, that the exchange rate premium can
be decomposed into a term relating to real risk, a term relating to nominal (ination) risks,
and the interaction of the two. Hollield and Yaron (2001) perform such a decomposition and
argue that empirically the ination risk and the interaction terms seem to be of minor im-
portance, and that models of exchange rate risk premia should focus on real risk, as opposed
to nominal risk. Iwata and Tanamee (2009) run both standard nominal UIP regressions and
equivalent 'real UIP regressions' of the real exchange rate change on the real interest rate
dierential. They nd that the resulting UIP slope coecient from the regression in real
terms is no longer negative, but still very dierent from 1, conrming large deviations from
interest rate parity.2 Recent theoretical contributions that propose models with a real risk
explanation are Verdelhan (2010) and Martin (2011).
The literature dedicated to the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle is enormous and
cannot possibly be covered here. A number of surveys, by Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis
(1995), and Engel (1996) provide a good overview of the literature until then. Engel (1999)
examines the properties of the foreign exchange risk premium in sticky price general equi-
librium models, nding that, while such models are capable of producing large enough risk
premia, the implied premia are typically constant3. More recently, Alvarez et al. (2009) stress
the importance of time-varying risk premia resulting from endogenous market segmentation,
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) nd costs of actively managing foreign exchange portfo-
lios responsible for the failure of UIP, and Burnside et al. (2009) suggest a microstructure
approach in addressing the puzzle. In a related paper, Leduc (2002) explores the implications
of borrowing constraints in the two-country monetary model of Lucas (1982), with aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty. The mechanism, however, is quite dierent, as in his setup, no
bond trade takes place in equilibrium. In the present paper, agents are allowed to borrow up
to the borrowing constraint, which becomes binding only occasionally.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model structure, sec-
tion 3 discusses parameterization and briey comments on the solution technique. Section 4
presents the results. The nonlinear model with borrowing constraints is contrasted to a num-
2In particular, based on quarterly data from a sample of 43 countries, the authors nd slope coecients of
the standard nominal UIP regression to be -0.57 for developed and 0.32 for developing countries, while they
nd slope coecients of 0.22 and 0.13, respectively, for the case of the real regressions.
3At least, as long as the exogenous forcing process has constant variance, which is typical in the macroeco-
nomics literature.
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ber of interesting comparison cases: complete international nancial markets, the standard
incomplete-markets bond-economy without borrowing constraints, and the case of nancial
autarky. The comparison is presented in terms of impulse responses, sample simulated time
paths, results from a UIP regression and business cycle stylized facts from a simulation, and
some selected policy functions of interest. I also present some sensitivity analysis on the UIP
regression results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Model setup
The world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, each of which specializes
in production of one type of (traded) good. All idiosyncratic risk is assumed to be perfectly
insured among residents of a country, i.e. within-country nancial markets are complete. We
can therefore think of a representative consumer in each country that maximizes the expected
sum of future discounted utilities from consumption, Ct:
E0
1X
t=0
tu (Ct) ; (1)
where  is the discount factor. The utility function u (Ct) is taken to be of the constant
relative risk aversion form, u (Ct) = (1= (1  ))

C1 t   1

, where  is the coecient of
relative risk aversion. Aggregate consumption is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
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where CH;t and CF;t are the home country's consumption of home and foreign goods. Param-
eter  is the degree of home bias in consumption, parameter ! is the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption goods, which in this model corre-
sponds to the trade elasticity. The foreign representative agent faces an equivalent problem,
where foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Agents of each country receive an exoge-
nous country-specic (and therefore good-specic) endowment Yt or Y

t respectively in every
period t. I abstract from modeling a production side, and assume instead that outputs arrive
exogenously each period, following a bivariate autoregressive process of order 1:
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where  and  are coecients describing the autocorrelation and spillover properties of the
process, and "t and "

t are normally distributed mean-zero shocks with variance " and cor-
relation ". Throughout the remainder of the paper I denote with lowercase variables the
logarithm of original variables, that is, yt = log(Yt). Mean income, Y and Y , is normalized
to one.
Asset markets are incomplete in the sense that countries are only allowed to trade in one-
period risk-free bonds, BH;t and BF;t, which, respectively, promise one unit of domestic or
foreign consumption good in the next period and trade at price 1Rt and
1
Rt
, where Rt and R

t
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are the gross domestic and foreign real interest rate. Furthermore, dene the real exchange
rate, Qt, as the relative price of the foreign nal consumption good to the domestic nal
consumption good, and pH;t (pF;t) as the relative price of the domestic (foreign) consumption
good to the price of nal consumption. The terms of trade are dened as t = pF;t=pH;t. We
can then write the home country's budget constraint as:
BH;t
Rt
+
QtBF;t
Rt
= BH;t 1 +QtBF;t 1 + pH;tYt   Ct: (4)
Even though agents are assumed to be able to trade risk-free bonds in order to smooth
their consumption, they cannot do so unrestrictedly. In particular, I assume that the home
country's debt level cannot exceed some fraction K of the level of its steady state output
(which is normalized to 1):4
BH;t +QtBF;t   K (5)
The foreign country's budget constraint and the borrowing constraint are equivalent ver-
sions of equations (4) and (5). The borrowing limit for the foreign country is therefore given
by BH;t=Qt +B

F;t   K.
The domestic household's intratemporal optimization problem of choosing optimal con-
sumptions of the domestic and foreign good give the following intratemporal optimality con-
ditions:
CH;t = p
 !
H;tCt (6)
CF;t = (1  ) p !F;tCt (7)
Denote with t the Lagrange multiplier on the domestic household's budget constraint,
and with t the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. The representative household's rst
order conditions to the intertemporal optimization problem can then be stated as:
C t = t (8)
t   tRt = RtEt [t+1] (9)
tQt   tRtQt = RtEt [t+1Qt+1] (10)
BH;t
Rt
+
QtBF;t
Rt
= BH;t 1 +QtBF;t 1 + pH;tYt   Ct (11)
0 = t [BH;t +QtBF;t +K] (12)
Equation (8) relates Lagrange multiplier t to the marginal utility of consumption. Equa-
tion (9) is the Home country's Euler equation w.r.t. the bond paying in domestic goods,
which is obtained from the combination of the rst order conditions for Ct and BH;t and
4In principle, there is also a 'natural debt' limit as in Aiyagari (1994) according to which both countries will
not borrow more than the minimum value that the endowment can take at period t+1 discounted to period
t prices. To compute the natural debt limit in a two-country model, where the interest rate is endogenous, is
more dicult than in a partial equilibrium model where the interest rate is exogenous. In addition if one of
the constraint binds for one of the economies the interest rate generally diers for each agent (for a detailed
discussion see Anagnostopoulos (2006)). However, the debt limits we impose here are generally stricter than
the natural debt limit.
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states that the marginal benet from using debt to increase consumption at time t must be
greater than or equal to the expected marginal loss at time t+ 1 arising from the additional
debt. Equation (10) is the corresponding Euler equation w.r.t. the bond that pays in units
of foreign goods, BF;t. Equation (11) is the Home country's budget constraint, stating that
current consumption and outstanding debt have to be nanced either from current output or
by issuing new debt. Equation (12) is the complementary slackness condition with t being
the multiplier on inequality constraint (5). The foreign country faces an equivalent problem,
which results in a set of optimality conditions similar to equations (6) to (12).
In the following, in order to avoid having to solve a portfolio problem, I assume that only
one of the bonds are internationally traded. In particular, the domestic bond BH;t can be
internationally traded while the foreign currency bond BF;t is only held within the foreign
country (and as a result of the representative agent assumption, is therefore not traded,
BF;t = 0).
The equilibrium of this economy is dened as a path of prices fRt; Rt ; Qtg1t=0 together
with consumption plans fCH;t; CF;t; Ctg1t=0 and
n
CH;t; C

F;t; C

t
o1
t=0
and debt plans fBH;tg1t=0
and
n
BH;t
o1
t=0
such that:
1. CH;t and CF;t minimize the expenditure needed to buy one unit on domestic consump-
tion good, Ct, given by (2). Similarly, C

H;t, and C

F;t minimize the expenditure needed
to buy one unit on foreign consumption good, Ct .
2. Ct and BH;t maximize (1) subject to (4)-(5), for all t, and BH;0 given,
3. Ct , BH;t and B

F;t maximize the foreign version of (1) s.t. the foreign versions of (4)-(5),
for all t, and BH;0 and B

F;0 given,
4. the real interest rates clears the bond markets, BH;t +B

H;t = 0, B

F;t = 0, for all t,
5. the goods markets also clear, that is CH;t + C

H;t = Yt, CF;t + C

F;t = Y

t , and
BH;t
Rt
=
BH;t 1 + pH;tYt   Ct for all t.
The complete list of equilibrium conditions is summarized in Appendix A.
2.2 Comparison model economies
For easier interpretation of the workings of the incomplete market model with borrowing
constraints, and to put the results into perspective, it is of interest to compare the baseline
model of section 2.1 to a number of benchmark cases studied previously in the literature (see,
e.g. Baxter and Crucini (1995), Heathcote and Perri (2002)), which are briey summarized
in this section.
The rst of these benchmark cases is one of complete international nancial markets (CM).
In this model economy there exists a complete set of state-contingent assets for each possible
state of world tomorrow. It is well known, that this nancial market structure leads to full
international risk sharing, that is, to an equalization of the the ratio of marginal utilities
across countries to the real exchange rate:
6
Qt =
C t
C t
: (13)
The second benchmark case is the exact opposite of the above, the case in which no assets
can be traded internationally and the two economies are in nancial autarky (FA). As a result,
there is no room for intertemporal trade and the current consumption expenditure has to be
fully nanced from current income in both economies:
pH;tYt = Ct: (14)
Finally, a third interesting reference case is the incomplete-markets bond-economy without
the presence of additionally imposed ad hoc borrowing constraints (IM-unconstrained). In
order to avoid a well-known non-stationarity problem I assume that there is a (small) convex
cost on portfolio adjustments as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).5 The resulting Euler
equation under this nancial market assumption is given by:
1  BBH;t+1
Qt
= RtEt
"
C t+1
C t
Qt
Qt+1
#
3 Parameterization and solution technique
In this section, I outline the baseline parameterization of the model, which is also summarized
in Table 1. Both countries are symmetric in all structural parameters. The discount factor, 
is set to 0:99, corresponding to an annualized interest rate of about 4%. The degree of home
bias in consumption, that is the weight of domestic goods in the consumption basket, , is
set to 0:75, a value that implies an intermediate degree of countries' openness to trade.
Table 1: Parameterization
Discount factor  0:99
Coe. of relative risk aversion  1
Degree of home bias  0:75
Trade elasticity ! 0:44
Autocorrelation of AR(1)  0:95
Standard deviation of AR(1)  0:01
Borrowing constraint K 0:5
In line with most of the international business cycle literature, I assume a rather persistent
exogenous forcing process, taking the coecient of autocorrelation of the endowment process,
, to be 0:95 and a standard deviation of " = 0:01. I abstract from spillovers or cross-
country correlation of the shocks. The trade elasticity !, that is, the elasticity of substitution
5Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) document the problem of non-stationarity of the rst-order approximated
incomplete-markets bond-economy model, and propose several technical devices to introduce stationarity { out
of which the endogenous discount factor assumed here is one. As I interpret the portfolio adjustment cost
mainly as a technical device, I set B to a rather small value, B = 0:001.
7
between domestic and foreign good, is a crucial parameter in the class of open economy macro
models, and its value varies largely in the literature. While estimates from the trade literature
suggest values of around 6 or higher, the macro literature suggests substantially lower values,
especially when stylized facts on international relative prices are matched (see, e.g. Heathcote
and Perri (2002), Corsetti et al. (2008), Enders and Mueller (2009), Thoenissen (2010)).
Movements in the real exchange rate and the terms of trade will be larger in an economy
where the trade elasticity is lower. Since the present paper's aim is to address exchange rate
related puzzles, it makes sense to follow the macro literature in choosing a low trade elasticity.
More precisely, to match the relative volatility of the real exchange rate to output, which is
about 3% for US quarterly data, ! is taken to be 0:44. This value also implies that wealth
eects from any underlying shock are large and the incompleteness of nancial markets is of
great importance.
Parameter K governs the tightness of borrowing constraints, which I set to 50% of steady
state output in the baseline setting. This choice implies that in a model simulation the
borrowing constraint binds only at around 1:5% of the time.
Finally, I want to comment briey on the model solution method. To evaluate the mech-
anism of the paper, local approximation techniques like log-linearization around the non-
stochastic steady state cannot be used. Instead, a global solution technique needs to be used,
that can explicitly account for the inuence of second moments and occasionally binding in-
equality constraints on agent's policy functions. Further details about the solution technique
are provided in the appendix.
4 Results
This section illustrates the workings of the model with borrowing constraints, contrasting
it throughout to the reference cases of complete nancial markets (CM), nancial autarky
(FA) and the case where a single bond is internationally traded, but trade is not restricted
through ad-hoc borrowing constraints (IM-unconstrained). I start by presenting some impulse
responses from the comparison models, laying out the conditions under which this model
class can, at all, generate deviations from UIP. I then study sample time paths from a model
simulation, of the baseline model with borrowing constraints and of the comparison models.
I then turn to the main results, presenting the implied UIP coecients from simulated model
data, as well as some additional model moments documenting the properties of exchange rate
variations, interest rate dierentials, and the risk premium, and some business cycle stylized
facts. Finally, I present a comparison in terms of policy functions of interest, and the implied
stationary distribution, and discuss sensitivity of results.
4.1 Comovement properties in the comparison economies
Figure 1 presents impulse responses of the interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate
depreciation, in response to a one percent domestic output increase, for IM-unconstrained,
CM, and FA. Under all nancial market structures, in response to increased domestic output,
domestic good prices fall, leading to an exchange rate that depreciates on impact of the shock,
which then, as the shock fades out, slowly appreciates back to its steady state level. The drop
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Figure 1: Impulse response to a domestic output increase under various international nancial
market assumptions
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in the expected exchange rate change in gure 1 reects this (expected) appreciation along
the transition path. The response of the interest rate dierential depends heavily on the
nancial market structure. Under CM, it can be understood as follows: in response to the
shock consumptions in both countries increase, but more strongly in the domestic economy.
As a result the domestic interest rate falls more strongly than the foreign, leading to a drop
of the interest rate dierential. As can be seen the drop in the expected exchange rate change
and the interest rate dierential is one-to-one.
In the FA setup the behavior of the expected exchange rate change is qualitatively similar,
though quantitatively stronger. The interest dierential response is markedly dierent though:
because of a large negative income eect associated to the output increase (a strong fall in the
relative price of the domestic good), under FA, the foreign country benets even more from
the domestic output increase, and the response of the interest rate dierential is reversed.6
Finally, when inspecting the responses in the IM-unconstrained setup, we observe that, despite
market incompleteness, the responses appear almost identical to the ones obtained under CM.
As mentioned previously, the value of the intratemporal substitution elasticity is crucial
for the results, because of its large inuence on how international price movements impinge
on the relative wealth of both countries. To document this, gure 2 captures the comovement
properties of interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate change under the three
nancial market assumptions, displaying only the rst period { impact { response to a 1 %
domestic output increase as a function of the trade elasticity !, which is on the horizontal
axis.7 It can be seen that under complete markets the impact responses of the interest rate
dierential and subsequent exchange rate changes always comove one-to-one. Interestingly,
6Whenever the domestic country experiences a positive output realization (relative to Foreign), this lowers
the price of the domestic good relative to the foreign good, and, as a result, depreciates the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate. This leads to two eects, a substitution eect towards the relatively cheaper
good, and a (negative) income eect, as the decrease in the domestic good price also changes the value of its
current income, pH;tYt. The relative strength of these two eects depends crucially on the chosen value of the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution (see Corsetti et al. (2008) for a discussion). Calibrating the elasticity
of substitution such as to match the exchange rate variability of the data implies a relatively low value for this
parameter, such that small changes in relative quantities lead to large changes in international relative prices.
As a result the implied substitution eect described above is small; at the same time the implied negative
income eect is large.
7For convenience, the model impulse responses of gures 1 and 2 are derived from a log-linear solution of
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Figure 2: Impact impulse response to a domestic output increase under various international
nancial market assumptions
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turning to the incomplete-markets bond-economy, so the scenario in which a bond is traded
internationally but without the presence of borrowing constraints, these comovement prop-
erties are virtually identical. Finally, we can observe that it is only under the assumption
of nancial autarky, that the model is able to generate a less than one-to-one comovement,
or even a negative comovement of the interest rate dierential and subsequent exchange rate
changes. In this case, the exchange rate is determined by the relative quantities of domestic
versus foreign goods, that is, solely in the goods market (and not, like in the other nancial
market scenarios, jointly in the goods and asset market). As Figure 2 documents, to realign
the empirical nding of deviations from uncovered interest parity in a standard model of the
international economy two ingredients are crucial, that have been employed in the paper:
nancial markets need to be suciently incomplete, and the incompleteness needs to matter
a great deal. The latter is achieved through the parameterization of a low trade elasticity,
which lead to large wealth transfers through relative price movements.
4.2 Simulated time paths
Figure 3 portraits the behavior of the economy in response to a random sequence of shocks, for
the baseline model with borrowing constraints and the three comparison model economies.
The rst row displays the time paths of the countries' GDP, the second row turns to the
implied consumption paths. In the case of complete international nancial markets, the
presence of state contingent assets implies that the economies are relatively sheltered from
large income eects and that the consumption paths are unaected by them. In contrast, in
the other extreme case of nancial autarky, no assets can be traded internationally, which
means consumption paths are dominated by strong income eects: a positive output shock
that lowers the price of its good actually hurts the country, since it lowers the value of
its resources from which to nance current consumption. The cases of incomplete nancial
markets where a bond can be traded to borrow and lend internationally can be understood
as intermediate cases between CM and FA, where some of the negative income eect can {
the model. All results in the following sections will, however, be based on the true, nonlinear solution (also
for the comparison models).
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Figure 3: Sample simulated time paths
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not be averted as in the case of state-contingent payments, but { be alleviated by borrowing
internationally.
As can be seen in Figure 3, initially, in the rst 20 periods, when bond holdings are not
too dierent from zero, the consumption paths in the economy with borrowing constraints
do not behave too dierently from the behavior under IM-unconstrained (or even from the
behavior under CM). Once bond holdings move closer to one of the countries' constraint (in
this case Foreign's), this country's precautionary motives increase drastically. As a result,
the consumption paths start to diverge from their respective equivalent paths under CM and
behave somewhat closer like under nancial autarky. It is important to emphasize that this
does happen not only once a borrowing constraint becomes actually binding, but before,
as a result of the fear of becoming constrained in the future and the increasingly strong
precautionary motives.
The third row of Figure 3 turns to the cyclical behavior of the variables of main interest,
displaying the behavior of the (log) interest rate dierential and its decomposition into (log)
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expected exchange rate variations and a (log) risk premium. This decomposition follows Fama
(1984), and, stated for real variables, is given by
rt   rt = Et [qt+1   qt] + pt: (15)
As seen by the panels in the third row, the interest rate dierential and expected exchange
rate change in the case of CM always move together almost one-to-one. When consumption is
low in the Home country its interest rate is high. The domestic interest rate relates domestic
marginal utility of consumption today to marginal utility of consumption tomorrow, while the
foreign interest rate relates foreign marginal utility of consumption today to marginal utility
of consumption tomorrow. In addition, in each and every period the real exchange rate is
ecient, such that it always is equated to the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption. As
a result, the foreign asset is an equivalently good asset once transformed into the domestic
countries own currency, the interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate variations
move one to one, and the implied risk premium is (close to) zero.
On the other hand, there are very large deviations of interest rate dierential and expected
exchange rate variations under nancial autarky { a nding that is not surprising as the
UIP condition is not an equilibrium condition of the FA model, and the exchange rate is
entirely determined in the goods market. Under FA the domestic interest rate is low when
consumption is low and the domestic bond provides bad insurance.8 Moreover, the real
exchange rate uctuates much more strongly and leads to an ineciently high relative price
when domestic consumption is relatively low.
Finally, turning to our baseline model with borrowing constraints, there are also substan-
tial deviations from the UIP relation. When bond holdings are centered around zero and
precautionary motives are relatively weak for both countries, the implied consumption paths
behave similar to the case of the standard IM model. In such case, also in the model with bor-
rowing constraints, interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate changes move closely
together, and the implied risk premium is close to zero. This changes markedly when a state is
reached in which one of the countries has accumulated a substantial amount of debt. In such
case, the indebted country increasingly has the incentive to reduce its borrowing somewhat,
thereby trying to avoid becoming constrained and accepting that it has to reduce consumption
already somewhat earlier. As a result, the interest rates and expected exchange rate start
behave somewhat closer like under nancial autarky and a wedge between the two appears.
The asset of the country that has a stronger precautionary motive { that is, the country that
has become a debtor because of a history of relatively worse income situations { has to carry
a risk premium.
4.3 UIP regression results
Table 2 reports the results from the uncovered interest parity regression. There is a large
empirical literature, on the UIP coecients found from (nominal) UIP regressions { based on
a regression of nominal exchange rate variations on the nominal interest rate dierential. As
has been argued in the literature, it would seem intuitive to expect the currency of a country
that currently pays a higher interest rate to depreciate, such that no excess returns could be
8That is, the inverse shadow price of a bond that would be traded only domestically.
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Table 2: UIP regression coecients
borr.constr. IM-unconstr. CM FA
model (baseline) model model model
b 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000b 0:688 0:980 0:997  1:477
made in expectations. Equating the nominal interest rate dierential to the expected change
in the exchange rate would imply a UIP slope coecient of one. The empirical evidence for
this type of regression for advanced economies is in stark contrast to this. Coecients very
dierent from one have been found empirically, for advanced economies these are typically
even negative, suggesting that currency prices for high interest rates tend, instead, to appre-
ciate. Backus et al. (2001) report values of b between  1:84 and  0:74, based on exchange
rates of the US with The United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Based on a sample of 43
countries Iwata and Tanamee (2009) report UIP regression coecients of  0:57 for developed
economies, and 0:32 for developing countries9.
Less empirical work has been dedicated on estimating the relationship in real terms, that
is, running real UIP regression, { based on an equivalent regression in terms of real variables:
real interest rate dierential on the expected change in the real exchange rate. Iwata and
Tanamee (2009) nd UIP regression coecients of 0:22 for developed economies, and 0:13 for
developing countries based on the regression of (log) real exchange rate variations on the (log)
real interest rate. The puzzle of negative coecients disappears, nevertheless large deviations
from interest parity remain. As argued originally by Fama (1984), the empirical ndings of
large deviations from interest rate parity can be reconciled if one accounted for the possible
presence of an unobserved variable, a time-varying risk premium.
Macroeconomic models have a hard time generating such a time-varying risk premium. In
a theoretical model, the risk premium can be understood to capture the conditional covari-
ance of the stochastic discount factor (the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution) with
future exchange rates variations, which in principle disturbs the comovement of the interest
rate dierential with expected exchange rate changes. However, there are two reasons why
exchange rate risk premia in theoretical models are generally small. One concerns the solution
methods applied { often macro models are solved with (log) linear approximation methods,
that impose certainty equivalence and thereby ignore the inuence of a covariance term be-
tween future marginal utility and future exchange rates. This problem is explicitly accounted
for in the present paper, as the model simulations, on which the UIP regression results are
based, are derived from global solutions (this is true also for comparison model economies).
Nevertheless the covariance term of future marginal utility and future exchange rates typically
9As found by Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) the UIP puzzle is less puzzling among developing countries than
among developed countries. A possible reason is that when ination is low { that is, for the developed world
{ exchange rate adjustments tend to be slow because adjustment is costly (see, e.g. Alvarez et al. (2009) and
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010)).
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Table 3: Properties of interest rate dierential, expected exchange rate variations and risk
premium
borr.constr. IM-unconstr. CM FA
model (baseline) model model model
cov(Erer; p) 1e-2   0:0005  0:0000  0:0000  0:0080
cov(Erer; r   r) 1e-2  0:0006 0:0004 0:0004  0:0032
var(r   r) 1e-2  0:0009 0:0004 0:0004 0:0022
var(Erer) 1e-2  0:0012 0:0004 0:0004 0:0047
var(p) 1e-2  0:0008 0:0000 0:0000 0:0135
is of minor importance, implying a strongly positive, almost one-to-one relationship between
the interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate changes. Columns 2 and 3 of Table
2 show that, in the case of complete nancial markets (CM) and the incomplete-markets
bond economy without borrowing contraints (IM-unconstrained) this fact is manifested in
regression coecients of (close to) 1.
Figure 3 has shown that the implied dynamics of the model with borrowing constraints
dier markedly from the case of complete markets and the unconstrained incomplete-markets
bond-economy scenario. The presence of the time-varying risk premium drives a wedge be-
tween interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate changes, and lowers the UIP re-
gression coecient, b, to 0:688. While this moves the UIP coecient closer to its empirical
counterpart, the channel of borrowing constraints is not able to resolve the UIP puzzle quan-
titatively.
To understand the sources of the regression results in Table 2 it is useful to consider
again the decomposition of the (log) interest rate dierential into (log) expected exchange
rate variation plus the risk premium. As pointed out by Fama (1984) from the decompo-
sition in equation (15) it can be seen that in a regression of actual changes in the (log)
exchange rate on the (log) interest rate rate dierential, qt+1 =  +  (rt   rt ) + ut+1,
the sign and size of the regression coecient b depends on the variance and covariance
of the variables of equation (15). In particular, to replicate the negative UIP coecientb = CovfEtqt+1;Etqt+1+ptgV ar(Etqt+1+pt) = Cov(Etqt+1;pt)+V ar(Etqt+1)V ar(Etqt+1+pt) , pt and Etqt+1 need to have a
negative covariance, and pt needs to have greater variance than Etqt+1. For matching the
empirical coecients based on real UIP regressions, the theoretical conditions on the comove-
ment properties of expected exchange rate variations and the risk premium are less stringent.
Table 3 summarizes the volatility and comovement properties of the interest dierential, ex-
pected exchange rate changes and the risk-premium term. While the model with borrowing
constraints is successful in generating a negative covariance between expected exchange rate
changes and the interest rate dierential, the risk premium is not volatile enough to generate
a negative UIP regression coecient.
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Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics
borr.constr. IM-unconstr. CM FA
model (baseline) model model model
c/y 1:18 1:19 0:93 1:63
gdp/y 1:19 1:02 0:72 1:64
rer/y 3:12 2:30 1:21 4:39
r/y 0:08 0:05 0:05 0:08
c;y 0:17 0:58 1:00  0:31
gdp;y 0:02 0:37 0:79  0:31
rer;y 0:63 0:55 0:69 0:69
r;y  0:78  1:00  1:00 0:30
(c c);rer  0:5768 0:9429 1:00  1:00
4.4 Business cycle statistics
Table 4 presents a summary of some additional second moments of the simulated model
data. An unwanted side-eect of the parameterization of a low trade elasticity and the
sizeable income eects that come with it, is that the model features a very high consump-
tion volatility. While the degree of exchange rate volatility was matched by calibrating the
trade elasticity correctly, it is noteworthy that the model is successful at addressing also
another long-standing puzzle in international economics. A large literature documents that
exchange rate data display a negative correlation with cross-country consumption ratios, that
is, that there is an apparent lack of ecient risk sharing (see Backus and Smith (1993)). The
presence of international borrowing constraints increases the incompleteness of the nancial
markets which decouples consumption paths from their relative price and thus help realign
the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly with respect to the data.
4.5 Stationary distribution of bond holdings, and nonlinearity of policy
functions
As has been argued, the presence of borrowing constraints makes the incompleteness of the
standard bond-economy case worse: we could expect the comovement behavior of interest rate
dierential and exchange rate changes to be somewhat closer to the case of nancial autarky.10
It is crucial, however, to note that the wedge in the interest rate parity relationships generally
does not stem from international trade in the bond actually stopping because a borrowing
constraint is hit, which happens only 1:5% of the times. As long as bond holdings are often
enough close to either country's borrowing constraint, they will have a signicant inuence
on the behavior of the model economy's variables. Figure 4, which plots the stationary
10In fact, one can interpret the scenario of nancial autarky as the limit case of the model presented in
section 2, with the constraints K, K being set to zero.
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Figure 4: Stationary distribution of bond holdings
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distribution of bond holdings in its unconstrained and constrained version, helps to illustrate
this fact, and shows that this is indeed the case. A lot of mass of bond holdings is situated
far away from the center when the nonlinear eects from increased precautionary motives are
strongest.
This eect of the presence of the international borrowing constraints and strength of
precautionary motive can also be seen by directly inspecting the policy functions. Figure
5 plots the policy functions for consumption and the real exchange rate, as functions of
bond holdings and the domestic output endowment, keeping the level of the foreign output
endowment at a constant (low, average and high) level. As can be seen, the presence of
the borrowing constraints lead to a very dierent behavior of all variables compared to the
standard incomplete-markets bond-economy case without borrowing constraints, which are
included as the transparent surfaces in Figure 5.
4.6 Sensitivity analysis
This section presents some sensitivity analysis for the main results of UIP regression coe-
cients for the model with borrowing constraints. In particular, table 5 presents results for the
UIP regression coecient, b, for several parameter variations. When borrowing constraints
become tighter, the UIP regression coecient decreases. E.g., for K = 0:25, b drops to 0:603.
Similarly, more volatile or more persistent output shocks imply that bond holdings more
frequently travel to regions where the precautionary motives are strong, leading to a larger
risk-premium and translating into larger deviations of the UIP regression coecient from 1.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a stylized two-country model in which precautionary motives { that
arise from the presence of international borrowing constraints { help generate a time-varying
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Figure 5: Consumption and real exchange rate policy function
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for UIP regression coecient b
K = 0:25 K = 0:5 K = 1
0:603 0:688 0:808
" = 0:005 " = 0:01 " = 0:015
0:724 0:688 0:676
 = 0:9  = 0:95  = 0:98
0:838 0:688 0:662
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exchange rate risk premium. It has long been argued that a time-varying risk premium on
foreign exchange may help explain the empirical failure of uncovered interest rate parity, yet
few theoretical models have had success in generating such a premium. In the model of the
present paper, a risk-premium arisis from the presence of borrowing constraints which drives
a wedge between the interest rate dierential and expected exchange rate changes, thereby
lowering the coecient in a UIP regression and bringing it somewhat closer to the data.
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A Appendix: The Model's Equilibrium Conditions
The model's equilibrium equations can be listed as follows:
Qt =

 + (1  ) 1 !t
 1
1 !
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1 !
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0 = t [BH;t +K] (27)
0 = t

BH;t
Qt
 K

(28)
B Appendix: Solution Technique
The model is solved by an iterative algorithm to nd the conditional expectations of the
model's equilibrium conditions. Below I briey outline the steps of the algorithm used:
 In the following, denote t + 1 variables with a prime, e.g. B = Bt 1, B0 = Bt, and
accordingly, B00 = Bt+1. I construct a 3-dimensional grid over the model's state variables
at time t, that is, over B; y = log Y; y = log Y  consisting of nbnyny grid points. The
grid in dimension of b ranges from [ K;K]. The gridpoints in dimensions of y, y
are obtained by discretizing the continous AR processes by following the method of
Rouwenhorst (1995) . As a recent contribution by Kopecky and Suen (2010) shows, the
Rouwenhorst discretization has proven to lead to substantially better approximations
than more conventional discretizations, e.g. Tauchen and Hussey (1991), particularly
when the underlying process is very persistent, as is the case here. The number of
gridpoints was chosen to be nb = 51 and ny = ny = 7.
 Set counter equal to 1. I make initial guesses on the model's conditional expectations by
using the log-linear solution as starting point. In the endowment economy guesses are
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made for the conditional expectations of the bond Euler equations, CEBH (B; y; y
) 
E fuC0g, CEBH (B; y; y)  E
n
uC0
Q0
o
and CEBF  (B; y; y
)  E fuC0g, at each grid-
point (B; y; y).
 Using the guesses for the conditional expectations, the endogenous variables B0, CH , CF ,
C, CH , C

F , C
, R, R, , ,  , andQ can be computed at each gridpoint, by solving the
set of equilibrium conditions outlined in Appendix A, equations (16)-(28). This is done,
by initially assuming that the borrowing constraints do not bind, i.e.  = 0 and  = 0.
In case that at any gridpoint (B; y; y) one of the borrowing constraints is hit, the bond
holding is set to the constraint and system (16)-(28) is solved again for the respective
(positive) value of the multiplier on the constraint. Having in hand the guesses of the
conditional expectations as functions of (B; y; y), I use interpolation methods to nd
CE0BH , CE
0
BH and CE
0
BF  , as functions of (B
0;Ey0; Ey0). CE0BH , CE
0
BH and CE
0
BF 
can in turn be used to obtain B00; C 0H ; C
0
F ; C
0; C 0H ; C
0
F ; C
0; R0; R0; 0; 0;  0, and Q0 for
any (B; y; y).
 Having in hand solutions for C 0, C0, and Q0, together with the discretized states and
transition matrix, , for the exogenous processes, the guesses of the conditional expec-
tations can be updated by computing:
CEBH (B; y; y
)  Et

C t+1

=
X
(y0; y0jy; y)C 0  B0; y0; y0 
CEBH (B; y; y
)  Et

C t+1 =Qt+1

=
X
(y0; y0jy; y)
h
C0
 
B0; y0; y0
 
=Q0
 
B0; y0; y0
i
CEBF  (B; y; y
)  Et

C t+1

=
X
(y0; y0jy; y)C0  B0; y0; y0 
 The above steps are repeated until convergence is achieved.
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